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PROPERTY AND INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF
PUTATIVE SPOUSES IN CALIFORNIA: SELECTED
PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
by Harry S. Laughran* & Catherine W. Laughran**
I. INTRODUCTION
California jurisprudence traditionally has treated a relationship involving cohabitation' as belonging to one of three categories: marital,2

putative, 3 or meretricious 4 (nonmarital).5 Marital property rights of
* A.B., 1962, LL.B., 1965 (Tulane University). Professor of Law, Loyola Law School,
Los Angeles.
** A.B., 1967 (Indiana University); M.A., 1973 (California State University, Los
Angeles); J.D., 1976 (Loyola Law School). Office of the General Counsel, The California
State University and Colleges. Ms. Laughran contributed primarily with respect to Part
IV.
The authors appreciate the research assistance of Sandra Weishart, University of
California, Los Angeles, School of Law, Class of 1979 (Loyola Law School, 1976-77), and
Terri Siegel, Loyola Law School, Class of 1979.
1. For purposes of this article, the cohabitants are assumed to be of opposite sex.
Living arrangements involving persons of the same sex, while presenting fascinating legal
questions, see, e.g., Comment, Same Sex Marriage and the Constitution, 6 U.C.D. L.
REv. 275 (1973), are not treated herein.
Most of the issues and rules of law discussed in this article are, at least at face value,
sex-neutral. But see, with respect to underlying cultural values, economic realities,
and the role of law, Laughran, Management and Control of Community Property in
California: "Retroactive"Applicationof the 1975Amendments, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 493,
497-98 n.21 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Laughran].
2. Marriage is defined as "a personal relation arising out of a civil contract, to which the
consent of the parties capable of making that contract is necessary. Consent alone will not
constitute marriage; it must be followed by. . . solemnization as authorized by this code
...

" CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1970).

Section 55 of the 1872 Code, the precursor of § 4100, recognized "common-law" (nonceremonial) marriages; that statutory authority was withdrawn in 1895. Act of Mar. 26,
1895, ch. 129, § 1, 1895 Cal. Stats. 121.
3. The basis for finding a "putative marriage" is set forth in CAL. CIv. CODE § 4452
(West Supp. 1977): "Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable
and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage
was valid, the court shall declare such party or parties to have the status of a putative
spouse.

....

"

Marriages which are void ab initio are those which are incestuous, id. § 4400 (West
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parties to a valid marriage are governed by California's community
property regime in the absence of a contract to the contrary. 6 Although
parties to a nonmarital relationship may contract with one another respecting property rights, 7 except "to the extent that . . . [such agree-

ments are] explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual
services," 8 the community property laws are inapplicable, 9 and no property rights arise as a matter of law from the fact of the relationship.10
The good faith party or parties to a putative marriage have been accorded
property rights both in cases where the relationship ends while both
1970), or bigamous, id. § 4401. Grounds for annulment of voidable marriages are set forth
in id. § 4425 (a)-(f). See generally Comment, Dissolutionand Voidable MarriageUnderthe
California Family Law Act, 4 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 331 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Dissolution and Voidable Marriage].
4. A "meretricious relationship" is one involving cohabitation with knowledge that
there is no valid marriage. Either cohabitant, or both, may be meretricious. Comment,
Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 866, 873
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Putative and Meretricious Spouse].
5. "Meretricious" is an opprobrious term, defined as pertaining to prostitution. WEaSTER'S NEW INT'L DiCr., UNABR. 1539 (2d ed. 1954). "Meretrix," a feminine term, means
harlot or prostitute. Id. (Would the masculine equivalent be "meretror"? There is no
dictionary listing. See note I supra on the legal impact of cultural values.)
Recognizing that "ihe mores of.

.

. [our] society have.

. .

changed.

. .

radically in

regard to cohabitation," Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 831 (1976), courts have begun using less scurrilous terminology. Certain of such
relationships may now be referred to as, for example, "nonmarital relationships," id. ;
"non-marital family relationship[s]," Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529,531,122
Cal. Rptr. 604, 605 (1975); and "actual family relationships," In re Marriage of Cary, 34
Cal. App. 3d 345, 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 867 (1973).
6. The community property regime is legal, not conventional; that is, marriage triggers
its application as a matter of law. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5133 (West 1970). The parties may,
however, contract their way out of the system, either totally or partially. See, e.g., id. §§
5103, 5133-5135; In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3
(1976).
7. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
8. Id. at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
9. Id.
10. Id.; Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962); Vallera
v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
Doubt was cast on this point in 1973, when the First District Court of Appeal held the
provisions of the Family Law Act applicable to a nonmarital "actual family relationship."
In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973). Cary was followed
in the Fourth District in Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975).
Other districts declined to follow Cary. Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122
Cal. Rptr. 604 (3d Dist. 1975); Marvin v. Marvin, No. 44359 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist. July
23, 1975), rev'd, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976); see also Powell v.
Rogers, 496 F.2d 1248, 1251 n.1 (9th Cir.), ce t. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974). The
supreme court opinion in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665, 557 P.2d 106, 110, 134
Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (1976), expressly rejected Cary/Atheriey on this point.
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parties are living11 and where it ends with the death of one "spouse.' 12
Property rights of putative spouses in California originally were governed by decisional jurisprudence and were decided on a case-by-case
basis,13 either by analogy to the community property laws 14 or under
general equitable principles.15 Since 1970, in annulment actions these
rights have been governed by section 4452 of the Civil Code.' 6 In
probate, in the absence of a statutory provision, cases presumably will
continue to be decided as in the past.17
Until recently, development of California law with respect to property
rights of putative spouses was fairly orderly. Two recent developments
have engendered confusion. First, the court in In re Marriageof Cary,18
by way of dictum, interpreted Civil Code section 4452 as requiring that,
in annulment actions, all property acquired by either party to a putative
relationship, which would have been community or quasi-community
property of a valid marriage, be divided between the parties pursuant to
Civil Code section 4800,19 regardless of the bad faith of one of the
parties.20 The supreme court in Marvin v. Marvin2 ' disapproved the
holding of Cary,22 but indicated in a footnote that the Cary interpretation
of section 4452 might be correct.23 Second, the court in Estate ofLevie24
held that a surviving putative spouse was not an heir to the separate
property of the deceased "spouse" under section 221 of the Probate
Code.'
The following section of this article will set forth briefly the California
law governing the property of putative marriages. The next section will
11. E.g., Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354, 295 P. 339 (1931); Schneider v. Schneider, 183
Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920); Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911).
12. E.g., Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976); Estate of
Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974); Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d
766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948).
13. See generally, e.g., Luther & Luther, Support and Property Rights of the Putative
Spouse, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Luther & Luther].
14. Id. at 313-14.
15. Id.
16. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1977).
17. See Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974).
18. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).

19. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1977) sets forth a general rule of equal
division.
20. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 351, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
21. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).

22. Id. at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
23. Id. at 680 n.18, 557 P.2d at 120 n.18, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829 n.18.
24. 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 123 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1975).

25. CAL. PROB. CODE § 221 (West 1956).
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deal with multiple claimant problems which may arise in the future. The
final two sections will examine and criticize the two developments
mentioned above. In conclusion, attention will be directed to treatment of
the same problems in the civil law, from which both community property 26 and the doctrine of putative marriage2 are derived, and suggestions
for reform of California law will be offered.
II.

A BRIEF LOOK AT THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE PUTATIVE SPOUSE
IN CALIFORNIA

A.

Establishingthe Status: The Requisite Good Faith

The basis for according property rights to a party to a void or voidable
marriage is that one or both parties to the relationship believe in good
faith that the marriage is valid. Indeed, a person's status as a putative
spouse is only recognized so long as good faith persists. No rights are
accorded with respect to property acquired after a claimant learns of the
impediment to the validity of the marriage.2 8
Existence of the requisite good faith belief in the validity of the
marriage is a question of fact. Intelligence, education, and experience of
the claimant are among the factors to be considered in evaluating the
question.2 9 While some sort of marriage ceremony normally will have
occurred, solemnization or attempted solemnization is not essential. For
example, a good faith belief that the parties had entered into a valid
common law marriage in a jurisdiction that recognizes such unions
qualifies the claimant for putative spouse status in California. Good
faith may be found whether the claimant was laboring under a mistake of
26. See generally W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
1-91 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN].
27. Id. at 95-99.
28. Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 718-19, 200 P.2d 49, 55 (1948).

But see Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975), involving a
reverse twist on this problem. In Atherley, the decedent's relationship with his second
"wife" began as "meretricious;" they later purported to marry (after he obtained an
invalid Mexican divorce), at which time she became a putative spouse. The trial court held
that she could share only as to those assets acquired after the "marriage." On appeal, the
court held In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973),
applicable, and found the claimant to have had, in effect, the rights of a putative spouse
from the inception of the relationship. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 770, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 48. The
Cary/Atherley reasoning has been disapproved by the supreme court. See note 10 supra.
29. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 213 Cal. 664, 3 P.2d 307 (1931); Miller v.
Johnson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 123, 29 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1963); Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal. App. 2d
62, 89 P.2d 164 (1939).
30. Sancha v. Arnold, 114 Cal. App. 2d 772, 251 P.2d 67 (1952); see CAL. CIV. CODE §
4104 (West 1970).
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law3 ' or of fact. 32 The discussion in the next two subsections will proceed
on the assumption either that both parties are in good faith or that the
party claiming an interest in property acquired by his or her "spouse" is
in good faith.
B.

Termination of the Relationship While Both PartiesAre Living

Property acquired during a putative marital relationship which would
have been community or quasi-community property of a valid marriage is
termed "quasi-marital property." ' 33 Upon a judicial determination of
nullity, 34 quasi-marital property is divided in accordance with section

4800 of the Civil Code.
Civil Code sections 5107 and 5108 define separate property as all

property of a married person owned by that person prior to marriage, or
acquired during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. 35 Commu-

nity property is defined by exclusion in section 5110 as "all [other] real
property situated in this state and all [other] personal property wherever
situated acquired during the marriage by a married person while

domiciled in this state ....

,,36 Quasi-community property is real or

personal property, wherever situated, acquired by a married person while

domiciled elsewhere which would have been community property if he or
she had been domiciled in California at the time of its acquisition. 37
Under section 4800(a), the general rule upon dissolution of a marriage is
an equal division of community and quasi-community property. 38
The division of quasi-marital property upon annulment of a void or
voidable union might best be illustrated by use of several hypothetical
examples. In each case, assume that the parties are domiciled in Califor-

nia and an annulment action is filed; the suggested disposition of the
31. Estate of Levie, 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 123 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1975) (marriage between
first cousins celebrated in Nevada void as incestuous under Nevada law; no indication
that "wife" did not know of the consanguinity); Sancha v. Arnold, 114 Cal. App. 2d 772,
251 P.2d 67 (1952) ("common-law" marriage did not arise from relationship between
parties). Since the requisite good faith may be due to a mistake of law, there is no reason
why a mistaken belief in the validity of a common law marriage entered into in California
should not qualify the claimant as a putative spouse.
32. E.g., Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974) (marriage void
as bigamous; claimant did not know of existence of other wife).
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1977).
34. Or at a later time if the court expregsly reserves jurisdiction. Id.
35. Id. §§ 5107-5108 (West 1970). Rents, issues, and profits of separate property are
also separate property. Id.
36. Id. § 5110 (West Supp. 1977).
37. Id. § 4803. For a discussion of the quasi-community property legislation, see
Laughran, supra note 1, at 508-20, 532-34.
38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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property is that which would be ordered by the court upon finding the
union void or voidable and the requisite good faith on the part of one or

both parties." 9
1) A and B 4° purport to marry and remain domiciled in California.
A knows of the impediment to the validity of the marriage; B does not.
Ten thousand dollars is saved during the relationship, traceable to A's
earnings.4" The money is quasi-marital property,4 2 to be divided equally
between A and B. 43
2) A and B purport to marry and remain domiciled in California.
Both are in good faith. The parties save $40,000 during the relationship.
Of that amount, $10,000 is traceable to A's earnings and $30,000 to B's
earnings. The money is quasi-marital property, to be divided equally
between A and B.
3) A and B purport to marry' and remain domiciled in California.
Both are in good faith. During the marriage, A inherits $10,000 and the
parties acquire a parcel of land in California, paid for with B's earnings." The land is quasi-marital property, to be divided equally between
6
A and B;41 A takes the $10,000 as separate property.4
39. Id. § 4452.
40. So long as one spouse is male, and the other female, gender is irrelevant to the
discussion. The parties here are therefore denominated A and B, rather than H and W.
See note 1 supra.
41. Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property; once the
presumption is raised, the proponent of classification of a particular item of wealth as
separate property bears the burden of proof. Estate of Duncan, 9 Cal. 2d 207,217, 70 P.2d
174, 179 (1937); Wilson v. Wilson, 76 Cal. App. 2d 119, 125-26, 172 P.2d 568,572 (1946). A
similar presumption favoring classification as quasi-marital property should apply when
the other choice is classification of a particular item as the separate property of one or the
other "spouse."
42. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1977). It would have been community property
of a valid marriage, id. § 5110, since it was not separate property as defined in id. §§ 51075108 (West 1970).
43. Id. § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1977).
44. The land should be presumed quasi-marital property if acquired during the relationship; the proponent of separate property classification should bear the burden of proof.
That burden might be met by, for example, tracing the purchase price to separate (as
opposed to quasi-marital) funds. If the proponent of community or quasi-marital classification of a given item were required to trace the source of the funds with which the item
was acquired, "there would be but little room for the operation of the presumption."
Wilson v. Wilson, 76 Cal. App. 2d 119, 127, 172 P.2d 568, 572 (1946).
45. California courts will declare out-of-state land to be community property if it was
paid for with community funds, even though it is not within the literal definition of
community property in CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1977). Rozan v. Rozan, 49
Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957). Presumably they would declare out-of-state land to be
quasi-marital property if it was paid for with quasi-marital funds. Recognition of such a
decree by the courts of the situs jurisdiction raises issues of full faith and credit and

1977]
4)

RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE SPOUSES

A and B purport to marry in New York, and remain domiciled

there for some years. Both are in good faith. During that time, A inherits
$50,000 and $10,000 is saved, traceable to B's earnings. They then

move to California. A invests the $50,000 in California land. The
$10,000 is quasi-marital property, to be divided equally between A and

B ;47 A takes the land as separate property.48
Section 4452 of the Civil Code, effective in 1970, represents the first
statutory recognition of the putative marriage doctrine and the institution
of quasi-marital property. 49 Division of property which would have been
community property of a valid marriage previously was ordered by courts

50
in favor of a putative spouse in the absence of statutory provision. With
respect to property which would have been quasi-community property of
a valid marriage, it seems likely that division would have been ordered in
favor of a putative spouse, although no decisions on point have been

found. Section 4452 settles this issue.5 1 The pre-section 4452 case law

extended protection to the putative spouse "under a judicially created
52
equitable community property system analogous to the legal system."
The results as a general rule were the same as those indicated in the
hypotheticals above and provided for in section 4452. "[P]roperty which
would have been community property had the marriage been valid was

treated as community property and divided pursuant to the principles
governing community property." 53
Prior to the enactment of section 4452, although the cases established
an analog to the community property system, division of property accomity. Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1964). CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.5 (West
Supp. 1977) contains special provisions for division of community and quasi-community
property when the property subject to division includes real property situated in another
state. Section 4800.5 presumably would apply in similar cases involving quasi-marital
property, even though only § 4800 is mentioned in § 4452.
46. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107-5108 (West 1970). Separate property is not divided on
dissolution; the court's jurisdiction extends only to classifying the property as such. See
id. H9 4351, 4800, 5102 (West Supp. 1977).
47. Since it would have been quasi-community property of a valid marriage. Id. § 4803
(West Supp. 1977).
48. Since the land was purchased with an inheritance, which would have been separate
property even if the parties had been domiciled in California when the $50,000 was
acquired. Id. §§ 5107-5108 (West 1970). The quasi-community property legislation-is not
applicable to these funds or to land purchased with them. Id. § 4803 (West Supp. 1977).
49. Id. § 4452 (West Supp. 1977); Luther & Luther, supra note 13, at 311.
50. E.g., Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920); Coats v. Coats, 160
Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911).
51. Luther & Luther, supra note 13, at 317 & n.35.
52. H. VERRALL, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 89 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited
as VERRALL].

53. Luther & Luther, supra note 13, at 314.
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quired during the putative relationship was accomplished under the
inherent equitable powers of the courts, and according to equitable
principles.54 Section 4452 recognizes the equitable system in annulment
cases5 5 and mandates division according to section 4800. Absent the
putative spouse doctrine, the acquisitions of each party to the relationship
would be his or her separate property. It has been suggested that section
4452 does not create in favor of a putative spouse a legal or "vested"
interest in the acquisitions of the other party, as in the case of community
property of a fully valid marriage, 5 6 but rather creates a statutory remedy. 57
It will be argued below that even if a "vested" interest is created by
section 4452, it exists only in favor of a good faith party, in cases where
one party is not in good faith.5 Even if the interest is only "equitable,"
the analogy to the community property system should make available to
the putative spouse remedies which a legally married person has with
respect to unauthorized gifts of community property, 9 and duties of good
faith imposed on married persons should extend to putative spouses. 60

Further, reference to section 4800 in section 4452 clearly extends to a
putative spouse the set-off remedy provided by section 4800(b)(2) in
cases involving "deliberate misappropriation" of community or quasi61
community property.

C. Terminationof the Relationship by the Death of One of the Parties
There is no statutory scheme governing distribution of "quasi-marital
property" in the Probate Code. In fact, for purposes of succession on the
54. See, e.g., id. at 317 and authorities cited therein.
55. VERRALL, supra note 52, at 90.
56. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1977); Laughran, supra note 1, at 538 and
authorities cited therein.
57. Comment, Dissolution and Voidable Marriage, supra note 3, at 352.
58. See notes 326-35 infra and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal. 2d 690, 52 P.2d 221 (1935) (right to set aside gift
in its entirety when suit brought during marriage); Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340, 26
P.2d 447 (1933) (right to set aside gift as to one half after termination of marriage).
60. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5103 (West 1970); id. § 5125(e) (West Supp. 1977); Williams
v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 560, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1971); Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal. App.
2d 443, 205 P.2d 402 (1949).
61. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800(b)(2) (West Supp. 1977) provides:
The court may divide the community property and quasi-community property of the
parties as follows:
(2) As an additional award or offset against existing property, the court may award,
from a party's share, any sum it determines to have been deliberately misappropriated
by such party to the exclusion of the community property or quasi-community
property interest of the other party.
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death of a party to a putative union, there is no settled descriptive term
for property which would have been community property of a valid
marriage. Two recent succession cases have used the term "quasi-marital
property;" 6 2 for purposes of consistency and clarity, that term will be
used herein.
Despite the absence of a statutory provision, by analogizing to the
provision for distribution of community property, succession cases developed a distributive scheme parallel to that of the annulment cases
discussed above.6 3 Under Probate Code section 201,"4 upon the death of a

married person, one half of the community property belongs to the
surviving spouse and the other half is subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent; in the absence of testamentary disposition, the
survivor succeeds to the decedent's portion. Thus, upon the testate death
of one party to a putative union, the surviving putative spouse takes at
least one half of the quasi-marital property; 65 in the event of the decedent's intestacy, the survivor takes all of such property.66
Although decisions initially were based on equitable principles, the
courts forcefully equated the position of a surviving putative spouse with
that of a legal spouse. Thus, in Feig v. Bank ofAmerica,67 quasi-marital

property was said to be impressed with all the incidents of community
property "under the plainest principles of equity.''68 In Estate of
Krone,69 the surviving putative spouse was treated as an heir to the
decedent's share of the quasi-marital property:
[T]he logic appears irrefutable that if according to statute the survivor of a valid, ceremonial marriage shall be entitled to take all of
the community estate upon its dissolution, then by parity of reasoning why should not the wife inherit the entire estate of a putative
union upon the death of her husband intestate? Clearly she does
inherit all. 70
Another case, while continuing to apply equitable principles, viewed the
putative union as a partnership. 7 ' Under this view, the surviving putative
62. Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976); Estate of Vargas, 36
Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974).
63. E.g., Feig v. Bank of America, 5 Cal. 2d 266, 54 P.2d 3 (1936); Mazzenga v. Rosso,
87 Cal. App. 2d 790, 197 P.2d 770 (1948); Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d
741 (1948).
64. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956).
65. See Sousa v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970).
66. Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948).
67. 5 Cal. 2d 266, 54 P.2d 3 (1936).
68. Id. at 273, 54 P.2d at 7.
69. 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948).
70. Id. at 769-70, 189 P.2d at 743.
71. Sousa v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970).
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spouse is treated as having, in effect, a legal interest in the quasi-marital
72
property, one half of which is said to "belong" to the survivor.
In light of the strong language used in the cases to describe the putative
spouse's interest, it would.be logical to assume that a surviving putative
spouse should have the same rights as a legal spouse in cases of unauacquired during the union.
thorized transfers by the decedent of property
73
One case has so held, without discussion.
Whether a surviving putative spouse will be treated as a "surviving
spouse" for purposes of succession to the probate equivalent of "quasicommunity property" under section 201.5 of the Probate Code74 appears
to be an open question. Although such property technically is the separate property of the decedent, 75 it would have been community property
had domicile been established in California at the time of acquisition, and
the distributive scheme established in section 201.5 is exactly the same as
that for community property under section 201. It would seem logical to
extend to a surviving putative spouse the same protection with respect to
property which would have been "quasi-community property" of a valid
marriage as is accorded with respect to that which would have been
community property. The state's interest in protecting the otherwise
unprotected76 and the legislature's inclusion of quasi-community property within the definition of quasi-marital property for purposes of annulment actions77 support that logic.
III.

MULTIPLE CLAIMANTS

If A is legally married to B and, without dissolution of that union,
purports to marry C, a putative spouse, situations may arise in which
72.
Rptr.
73.
74.

Id. at 665, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 489; Estate of Ricci, 201 Cal. App. 2d 146, 148-49, 19 Cal.
739, 740-41 (1962).
Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976).
"Quasi-community property" is used herein to refer to property within California's

jurisdiction, acquired by the decedent while domiciled elsewhere, which would have been
community property if the decedent had been domiciled in California at the time of
acquisition. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5 (West Supp. 1977).
The term "quasi-community property" is not used in the Probate Code, but the

property defined in § 201.5 is substantially the same as that defined as such for purposes
of dissolution actions in CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (West Supp. 1977).
For a discussion of "quasi-community property" in probate, see Laughran, supra note
I, at 508-14, 532-34.
75. See Laughran, supra note 1, at 513.
76. Without the quasi-community property legislation, the property defined therein,
acquired during domicile in a non-community property jurisdiction, would be viewed as
the separate property of the decedent under California law. Upon the testate death of the
acquiring spouse while domiciled in California, the survivor could be left without any
share in such property. See id. at 532-34.
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1977).
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both B and C assert claims to property acquired by A during the
coexistence of the relationships.78
The problem of multiple claimants arose with some frequency under
California law as it stood prior to 1972. Earnings and accumulations of a
married woman living separate and apart from her husband were her
separate property, 79 while those of her husband were community property. Thus, if a married woman left her husband and purported to marry a
second, putative husband, there was no multiple claimant problem. The
putative husband had a quasi-marital property claim with respect to her
earnings during the period of their union; as to the legal husband, her
earnings during that period were her separate property. If, however, a
married man left his wife and purported to marry a second, putative wife,
each woman could assert a claim. The putative wife had a quasi-marital
property claim, while, as to the legal wife, his earnings were classified as
community property even though they were not living together.
In 1972, an amendment to section 5118 of the Civil Code took effect. 80
The amended section provides that earnings and accumulations of either
spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are
separate property.81 In 1976, in In re Marriageof Bouquet,8 2 the California Supreme Court accorded retroactivity to amended section 5118,
holding that the husband's earnings were separate property from the date
of separation. As a result of the Bouquet decision, the typical multiple
claimant case will no longer arise. Suppose, for example, 83 that H is
married to W, and while living with her, contributes toward acquisition
of an asset with his earnings. He then leaves W and purports to marry P,
a putative spouse. While living with her, he continues to contribute
toward acquisition of the same asset with his earnings. H then dies
intestate. The claims of W and P would not overlap since they would
arise from different time periods in H's life. The trial court would have to
78. B could never assert a claim to property acquired during the A-C union traceable to
the efforts of C; nor could C assert a claim to property traceable to B's efforts, or to
property of the A-B union acquired prior to the inception of the A-C relationship.
79. Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, 1969 Cal. Stats. 3340 (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 5118 (West 1970)) (amended 1971). An exception to the general rule that acquisitions
during marriage are community property, see CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1977),
this provision was based on long-standing prior law. See Act of Mar. 8, 1870, ch. 161, § 2,
1869-70 Cal. Stats. 226 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 169 (West 1954)) (repealed 1969).
80. Act of Dec. 10, 1971, ch. 1699, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stats. 3640 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5118 (West 1970)).
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1977).
82. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976). An extensive discussion of
the Bouquet case appears in Laughran, supra note 1, at 523-36.
83. The example is drawn from a modified and simplified version of the facts of Patillo
v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976).
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were attributable to those periods
determine the extent to which the funds
84
and apportion the asset accordingly.
Multiple claimant problems may continue to arise in atypical situations. In Estate of Vargas,85 H was living with both his legal wife (W)
and his putative wife (P) simultaneously. His "terrestial [sic] paradise" 86 ended with his intestate death. Each woman, absent the other,
would have been entitled to all of the property which H had accumulated
while living with her.87 Since it was found that "both wives contributed
in indeterminable amounts and proportions to the accumulations of the
communit[ies],''

the court "cut the Gordian knot of competing

89 by

claims"
dividing the estate equally between them, 9° observing that
"the wisdom of Solomon is not required to perceive the justice of the
result." 91
A more troublesome Vargas-type situation would arise if the practicing bigamist (A) died testate, leaving all property of which he or she
might lawfully dispose to a third person (X), and survived by both
spouses, B (legal) and C (putative). Assuming that all of the property on
hand was acquired by A during the coexistent unions with B and C,
neither of whom knew of the other, the court's task would be unenviable.
The statutes "are not designed to cope with the extraordinary circumstance of purposeful bigamy at the expense of two innocent parties. "92
Earlier cases seem inapposite, since they involved seriatim rather than
simultaneous living arrangements. In Sousa v. Freitas,93 for example,
the husband died testate, leaving all his property to the putative wife. All
the property in question was acquired during the putative relationship.
The trial court in effect denied his right to leave any property by will,
reasoning that the legal wife was entitled to one half of the property as
community property, and that the surviving putative wife was entitled to
the other half. 94 The court of appeal held the putative wife entitled to
three fourths of the property and the legal wife to one fourth. The
84. Id. at 217, 219, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 216, 217.
85. 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974).
86. Id. at 716, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
87. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956) (W's claim); Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App.
2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948) (P's claim).
88. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 719, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The mixed metaphor may not have been inappropriate in light of the bizarre fact
situation.
92. Id. at 718, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
93. 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970).

94. Id. at 664-65, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
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putative wife was found to have been "in effect" in a partnership with
95
the decedent, with the property held "in effect" in tenancy in common.
Thus, upon the husband's death, the putative wife owned one half of the

property; the other one half was community property of the legal marriage, half of which was subject to the decedent's testamentary disposition.9 6

In the case posited, either B or C, in the absence of the other, would
be entitled to one half of the property, with X taking the other half under
A's will. 97 With the presence of both B and C in the controversy with X,
there are at least three possible solutions.

First, X could be awarded one half of the property, with B and C each
taking one fourth. 98 This result would be reached by attributing one half
of the property to the legal community and one half to the putative
community. As to each community, A-would have rights of testamentary
disposition over one half of the attributed assets. 99
Second, focusing on the rights of B and C, they could each be
awarded one half of the property, with X taking nothing. 1" If, as

between A and B, B was entitled to one half and, as between A and C,
C was entitled to one half, and there was only one pie, there would be
nothing left for A to leave to X.101
95. Id. at 666, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
96. Id.
97. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956); see Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189
P.2d 741 (1948).
The same type of problem could occur while A is living and is one of the competing
claimants. Suppose, for example, that B finds out about C and sues A for dissolution, and
that C thereby finds out about B and sues A for a declaration of nullity. The assets
acquired by A during the relationships are quasi-marital property under § 4452 of the Civil
Code, to be divided as per § 4800; they are also community property under § 5110, again to
be divided under § 4800.
98. This result is suggested in H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 67 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as VERRALL & SAMMIS].

99. This result was reached by the trial court in Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209,
135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976), a case involving an analogous question. The court of appeal
reversed and remanded, however, since the case involved seriatim, not simultaneous
relationships, and the trial court had failed to anticipate the supreme court's holding on the
retroactivity of CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1977) in In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16
Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
100. This was the approach to the problem under Spanish law; it has been followed in
Louisiana. See generally Comment, The PutativeMarriageDoctrinein Louisiana, 12 LoY.
L. REV. 89, 119-27 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Louisiana].The same result was
reached by the trial court in Sousa v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970).
See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra. But see VERRALL & SAMMIS, supra note 98, at
66, for an argument against this solution.
101. Since, in this situation, A was by definition in "bad faith," the solution does not
seem offensive; estoppel principles could easily apply.
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Third, a court could apply a dash of "Solomonic wisdom" and "cut
the Gordian knot" 102 by awarding each claimant one third of the property. 03 The property could be viewed as having been acquired by a de
facto partnership consisting of A, B, and C, the contributions and
interests of each having been equal."
Another atypical, if not bizarre, situation involving multiple claimants
may arise under the "doctrine of apportionment of business profits." 10 5
Under the ruling in George v. Ransom," 6 codified in Civil Code sections
5107 and 5108, income or gain attributable to separate capital must also
be considered separate property. On the other hand, the skills, efforts,
and personality of a married person are community assets,10 7 and income
or gain attributable to community property is also community property. o8 It has long been settled that when the skill and effort of a married
person are expended in the management of separate capital, resultant
profits and increases in capital value must be apportioned between the
community and the separate estate of the spouse.109
Two leading cases have provided the names for the prevalent methods
of accomplishing such an apportionment: the "Pereira Method" ' 10 and
the "Van Camp Method.'
As explained by the supreme court in
Beam v. Bank of America, 112 apportionment is accomplished under the
PereiraMethod by allocating interest representing a fair rate of return on
the capital investment to the separate estate, with the rest of the gain
allocated to the community.11 3 Under the Van Camp Method, the community is credited with the fair value of the spouse's efforts with the
balance of the gain allocated to his or her separate estate. 114 The community
allocation under the latter method might amount to little or nothing if large
102. Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 719, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1974).
103. This possibility has been suggested in W. REPPY & W. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (1975) [hereinafter cited as REPPY & DE FUNIAK] and

by one of the authors of this article in classes and in unpublished teaching materials.
104. Cf. Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974) (estate divided
equally between legal and putative spouse).
105. VERRALL, supra note 52, at 219.
106. 15 Cal. 322 (1860).
107. See, e.g., Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909). See also CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 5110 (West Supp. 1977).
108. See, e.g., Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944); In re Marriage of
Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1975).
109. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909).
110. Id.

111.
112.
113.
114.

Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921).
6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971).
Id. at 18, 490 P.2d at 261, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
Id.
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amounts already have been taken by the managing spouse, either as salary or
profits, and expended for community purposes. 115 While it has been stated
that the Pereira Method is the "usual method of apportionment," 1' 16 the
supreme court has indicated more recently that there is no "rule" beyond
that which demands apportionment; in achieving apportionment, the trial
court in its discretion "may select [whichever] formula will achieve sub' 117
stantial justice between the parties.
In In re Marriageof Imperato,"1 8 the husband in 1969 had formed a
corporation of which he was sole shareholder; president, and manager.
On the date of separation in 1971, the corporation had a net worthof over
$1,600, which was stipulated to be community property. The husband
continued to operate the corporation after separation. At trial in 1973 the
court ruled that the community property would be valued as of the date
closest to the trial date for which proof of value existed.1 19 On that date,

just under two months prior to trial, the net worth of the corporation was
over $17,600. It was agreed that the husband would retain the business

and pay to the wife the value of her interest. 120 The trial court found that
the capital increment of almost $16,000 which had accrued between
the
121
date of separation and the date of trial was community property.
On appeal, the husband urged, first, that because of the applicability of
amended section 5118 of the Civil Code, 122 the community property
should have been valued as of the date of separation, "with all of the

increase in value subsequent thereto passing to the spouse that devoted
time and effort to its preservation.'

'123

The court rejected that argument,

noting that it "overlooks the inherent growth factor found in many
assets, investment and re-investment of capital, market fluctuations, and
115. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Gilmore, 45 Cal. 2d 142, 149-50, 287 P.2d 769, 773-74 (1955);
Tassi v. Tassi, 160 Cal. App. 2d 680, 690-91, 325 P.2d 872, 878-79 (1958).
116. Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733,740,371 P.2d 745,748,22 Cal. Rptr. 1,4(1962).
117. Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 18, 490 P.2d 257,261, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137,
141 (1971).
118. 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1975).
119. Id. at 434, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 591; see In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93,
113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); Randolph v. Randolph, 118 Cal. App. 2d 584,258 P.2d 547 (1953).
120. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 434, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
121. That finding is implicit from a reading of the appellate opinion; it is not expressly
stated.
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1977). See text accompanying note 81 supra.
123. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 437, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 593. This argument overlooked the fact
that amended § 5118 was not effective until March 4, 1972, so that his earnings from the
date of separation in 1971 until that date were still'community property. 45 Cal. App. 3d at
436 n.3, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 592 n.3. Amended § 5118 was subsequently held retroactive in In
re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
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numerous other components that can increase the value of most assets." 124 The court held that the valuation "should be determined as near
to the date of trial as reasonably practicable," ' 12 5 but that
[i]f the earnings of a spouse in some manner increase the value of a
community asset, the court must then determine what portion of the
asset is community property and what portion is separate property. .

.

. Valuation on date of separationis importantonly when it is

used in conjunction with the126
final valuationfor apportioningcommunity and separateproperty.
The husband argued alternatively that the increase in net worth of the
corporation between the date of separation and the date of valuation
should be considered earnings or accumulations within the meaning of
Civil Code section 5118 and classified as his separate property. 27 The
trial court rejected this argument, in part because he had paid himself a
salary from the business during that time period. 28 Earnings of a corporation generally are considered "profits" of the corporation, not normally attributable to individual shareholders. 129 On the other hand, the term
" 'earnings' . . . can encompass income derived from carrying on a
business as a sole proprietor where the earnings are the fruit or award for
labor and services without the aid of capital.' 130 The husband sought to
establish that the corporation was in fact his alter ego, so that, as in the
case of a sole proprietorship, its increase in value could be attributed to
his efforts. The trial court ruled inadmissible certain proffered evidence
in support of the alter ego theory.' 31 The appellate court found that "a
special situation exists when a husband and wife who are the sole
stockholders of a corporation are dissolving their marriage," 3 2 so that if
the facts support the alter ego theory, an exception should be recognized
to the general rule that "a sole stockholder is estopped to deny the
validity of his own corporation.' ' 13 3 Since the trial court had failed
adequately to consider the alter ego theory, and had precluded the
124. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 437, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
125. Id. at 436, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93 (quoting In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App.
3d 93, 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 68 (1974)).
126. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 436, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 593 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 437, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 593; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1977).
128. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 438, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 437, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 593 (citing Romanchek v. Romanchek, 248 Cal. App.
2d 337, 56 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1967)).
131. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 438, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
132. Id. at 440, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
133. Id. at 439 n.9, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 595 n.9.
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husband from presenting all of his evidence on the issue, the judgment
was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court. 13 4
In remanding, the Imperato court noted that if the trial court treated
the corporation as a sole proprietorship a "reverse" application of the
normal apportionment methods would be necessary. 3 5 Thus, although
the court's task would remain the apportionment of profits or gains
between separate and community property, in this case the capital would
be community property, while gain traceable to the efforts of the married
person, living separate and apart from the other spouse, would be
allocable to separate property.136
Application of apportionment principles, as interpreted in Imperato,
clearly could have great impact in multiple claimant cases. Assume a
situation involving our old friends, A, B, and C. A marries B and,
while they are living together, accumulates $10,000 in community property. A leaves B, taking the $10,000. A purports to marry C, who is in
good faith. During the relationship between A and C, A opens and
operates a business which is capitalized with the $10,000. As between A
and B, the capital is community property, but the fruits of A's efforts
after their separation are allocable to A's separate property. 3 7 As between A and C, the capital is A's separate property, 3 ' in which C has
no interest; 39 however, the fruits of A's efforts during the "marriage"
and while A and C are living together" ° are allocable to quasi-marital
property.' 4 ' If A dies, or in the event of an annulment action (and/or a
dissolution action), a multiple claimant "reverse" apportionment problem could arise.142
The context and the apportionment method chosen will affect the
interests of not just two, but all three of the persons involved. An
apportionment of community and separate property between A and B
will affect C's interests, since what is A's separate property as between
A and B would be quasi-marital property of A and C. B would be
affected similarly as a result of an apportionment between A and C. In
134. Id. at 440-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96.
135. Id. at 438-39, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
136. Id. at 439, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1977).
138. Since it was owned prior to "marriage." See id. §§ 5107-5108 (West 1970).
139. Id. § 5102 (West Supp. 1977).
140. Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976).
141. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1977).
142. Such a problem could also arise in the event of the testate death of B or C if the
testator attempted to bequeath community or quasi-marital property to someone other

than A.
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the hypothetical set forth above, assume that B brings a dissolution
action against A three years after their separation and the A/C "marriage." The value of the community property at the date of separation
would be $10,000 (the money A took on leaving B). If the business is

worth $40,000 at the time of trial, a "reverse" apportionment will be
necessary as to the $30,000 increment. If the PereiraMethod is used, a

fair return will be allocated to the community capital, with the rest of the
gain allocated to A's separate estate. Assuming a seven per cent rate of
return, 143 the total allocation to the community for the three year period
would be $2,100, with the rest of the gain, $27,900, allocated to A's
separate estate. As between A and C, the $27,900 would be quasi-

marital property. Under the Van Camp Method, the reasonable value of
A's services (less draws or salary actually taken) 144 would be determined

and allocated from the gain to A's separate estate, with the rest of the
gain allocated to the community. If, for example, A had withdrawn
$25,000 a year in salary, and the evidence showed that a reasonable
salary for the general manager of such a business would not have
exceeded that amount,145 the entire $30,000 gain conceivably could be
146
allocated to the community, with no allocation to A's separate estate
(considered quasi-marital property of A and C).147

48
The potential fact situations are too diverse for individual treatment, 1
and a court is not bound to one apportionment formula.149 Indeed, one
noted authority has observed that the "substantial justice" language in

the cases
143. The court is not bound to a predetermined rate of return. For example, in In re
Marriage of Folb, 53 Cal. App. 3d 862, 126 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1975), disapprovedon other
grounds, In re Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738, 749 n.5, 552 P.2d 1169, 1175 n.5, 131
Cal. Rptr. 873, 879 n.5 (1976), the evidence supported allowance of a twelve per cent rate
of return.
144. In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 439, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594
(1975).
145. See Tassi v. Tassi, 160 Cal. App. 2d 680, 690, 325 P.2d 872, 878 (1958).
146. Unless A could show that, because of the nature of the business, unique personal
attributes and efforts, and other pertinent factors, his or her personal contribution to the'
gain exceeded the $25,000 withdrawn annually.
147. If there is a time gap between A's separation from B and "marriage" to C, any
gain attributable to A's efforts during that period would belong to A and would not be part
of the quasi-marital property. Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 216-19, 135 Cal. Rptr.
210, 215-17 (1976).
148. For instance, if some of A's capital investment were separate property and the
rest community property of A and B, the same principles would apply, but the problem
obviously would be more complex. Even more complicated would be a problem where
A's living arrangements with B and C were simultaneous during part of the relevant time
period. See notes 78-104 supra and accompanying text.
149. See note 117 supra and accompanying text.

19771

RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE SPOUSES

is certainly no invitation for a trial court to disregard any evidence
bearing on the productivity of capital or of management. .

. Equal-

ly it is no invitation for the trial court to select one or the other of the
formulas because in its uncontrolled discretion it believes the result
the
will be abstract fairness to the parties. It can only mean that
50
court should select the formula that the evidence requires. 1
The hypothetical examples above are set forth merely to illustrate the
working of the apportionment formulas in a simple multiple claimant
situation and the varying impact on the interests of the claimants depending on the formula applied.
Because of that potential impact, the problem should be approached by
' in question (the gain) and the relationfocusing on the "new wealth" 151
ships existing at the time of its acquisition. "New wealth acquired during
marriage is presumptively community property and business profits are
new wealth." 152 By parity of reasoning, "new wealth" acquired during
the "marriage" of A and C is presumptively quasi-marital property. 15It3
should be incumbent upon the person urging a different classification
of part of the gain to rebut that presumption with clear and convincing
proof. 154 Thus, in the absence of proof of a greater (or lesser) contribu-

tion, the capital contribution (community property of A and B) would be
presumed entitled to a fair rate of return,1 55 with the rest of the gain
allocated to the quasi-marital property. In many instances this approach
will result in a greater allocation to the quasi-marital property, to the
detriment of the legal spouse. The focus on the time period during which
the gain accrued is, however, perfectly consistent with community property principles, and is also consistent with the approach of the courts in
other competing claimant situations.156
150. VERRALL, supra note 52, at 223.
151. Id.at 220.
152. Id.
153. In the hypothetical, A, urging classification as separate property inan action
between A and C,or B, urging classification as community property inan action between
B and A or between B and C.
154. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 115, 160, 502, 660 (West 1976); id. § 605 (West Supp.
1977). See also Estate of Duncan, 9 Cal. 2d 207, 217, 70 P.2d 174, 179 (1937) ("clear and
satisfactory proof"); VERRALL, supra note 52, at 147-48.
155. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 7, 103 P. 488, 491 (1909).
156. See Sousa v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970); cf. Estate of
Ricci, 201 Cal. App. 2d 146, 149, 19 Cal. Rptr. 739, 740 (1962) (interest of putative spouse
limited to property acquired during relationship between putative spouse and decedent).
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RIGHTS OF A SURVIVING PUTATIVE SPOUSE TO SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE DECEDENT: ESTATE OF LEVIE

A party to a fully valid marriage has no interest in the separate property
of the other spouse during the marriage; 57 the same is true of a party to a
putative marriage. A married person who dies may dispose of all of his or
her separate property by will;' 58 only in the event of intestacy does the
surviving spouse share in the separate property of the decedent.' 5 9 Depending on the facts, the surviving spouse takes one third,16° one half,' 6 '
or all' 62 of the separate property of the intestate decedent. The conclusion
would seem inescapable that if a surviving putative spouse is a "surviving spouse" for purposes of succession to property which would have
been community property of a fully valid marriage, 163 the same person is
a "surviving spouse" for purposes of succession to separate property. 164
166
In a poorly-reasoned, unsound 165 decision, the court in Estateof Levie
held otherwise.
In Levie, the "husband" died intestate, survived by the "wife" and
more than one child, all of whom were the issue of a previously dissolved
marriage. The "wife" petitioned for a determination of heirship. It was
stipulated that she and the decedent had believed in good faith in the
validity of their marriage. The trial court determined that, as a surviving
putative spouse, she was entitled to all of the quasi-marital property and
to one third of the separate property of the decedent. 16 7 The administratrix (one of the decedent's children) appealed. The court of appeal
reversed in part, limiting the putative wife's rights to succession to quasi68
marital property. 1
On appeal, the "widow" argued first, that her marriage to the decedent should be recognized as valid in California judicial proceedings, and
second, that even if the marriage was invalid, she should receive a
157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5102 (West Supp. 1977).
158. CAL. PROB. CODE § 20 (West Supp. 1977).
159. Id. § 220 (West 1956). See also id. §§ 221, 223-224.
160. If the decedent also is survived by more than one child, or by one child and the
lawful issue of one or more deceased children. Id. § 221.
161. If the decedent also is survived by only one child or the lawful issue of a deceased
child, id., or by a parent or parents or the issue of either parent, id. § 223.
162. If the decedent leaves neither issue, parent, nor issue of a parent. Id. § 224.
163. See, e.g., Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948).
164. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956) with id. §§ 221, 223-224.
165. W. REPPY, 1977 SUPP. TO REPPY & DE FUJNIAK, supra note 103, at I [hereinafter
cited as REPPY, 1977 Supp.].
166. 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 123 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1975).
167. Id. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 201, 221 (West 1956).
168. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 577, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
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surviving spouse's share of the separate property of the decedent. The
court rejected both arguments.
The "widow" and the decedent, who were first cousins, were residents of California both before and after the marriage ceremony. They
entered into a procedurally valid ceremonial marriage in Nevada. The
marriage was void as incestuous under Nevada law because of their
consanguinity, 169 although, as first cousins, they could have been lawfully married in California.170 The administratrix contended that the marriage was void in California because it was void in Nevada, the jurisdiction where it was contracted. The "widow," relying on a choice-oflaw analysis supported by Hurtado v. Superior Court,171 argued that
because the marriage would have been valid if celebrated in California, it
should be treated as valid in the probate proceeding in the California
forum. In rejecting her argument, the court relied on section 4104 of the
Civil Code which provides: "All marriages contracted without this state,
which would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the same
were contracted, are valid in this state."' 7 a The court held that section
4104 "by implication adopts the common law rule that 'the law of the
place of marriage controls the question of its validity,' "173 and that it "is
a legislative direction governing the choice of law." 174 Thus, Nevada law
7
was controlling in the California forum, and the marriage was void.1 1
169. Id. at 575, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 446 (citing NEV. REV. STATS. § 122.020 (1973)).
170. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4400 (West 1970).

171. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
172. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4104 (West 1970); see also Act of Apr. 22, 1850, ch. 140, § 5,
1850 Cal. Stats. 424, the predecessor of the present version.
173. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 576, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (quoting Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Cal. 2d
276, 280, 169 P.2d 633, 635 (1946)).
174, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 576, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
175. While a thorough discussion of the choice-of-law problem presented in Levie is
beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that the Levie court's application of the
lex celebrationis rather than the lex for et domicili has been termed "plainly wrong."
REPPY, 1977 SuPP., supra note 165, at 1. Professor Reppy cites to REPPY & DE FUNIAK,
supra note 103, at 471-72, where the "interest analysis" approach, which California

courts use in other situations, is discussed. A more thorough discussion of choice-of-law
principles relating to the validity of marriages may be found in A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 376-87 (1962), wherein Professor Ehrenzweig argued that
marriages which are invalid where celebrated but which would have been valid if celebrated in the forum should be recognized under a "Rule of Validation." Validation of the
marriage in Levie would, of course, have depended upon a-different reading of CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4104 (West 1970) than that of the court. The court construed § 4104 as a legislative
directive precluding application of the lexfor! et domicili!. Under a narrow reading of the
section, it would be inapplicable in a case such as Levie, since by its terms it is limited to
recognition by California of the validity of marriages which were valid under the lex
celebrationis. If the section were so construed, the California court arguably would be
free to apply a "Rule of Validation."
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The court then summarily rejected the "widow's" contention that,
notwithstanding the invalidity of the marriage, she should be considered
a "surviving spouse" for purposes of intestate succession to separate
property of the decedent under Probate Code section 221. The court
stated:
No California decision has been found, suggesting that a putative
spouse is entitled to succeed, under Probate Code section 221, to an
interest in any property which the decedent owned before the putative marriage. The equities connected with property acquired during
the putative marriage do not apply, as the joint efforts of the puta-

tive spouses did not contribute to the acquisition of previously held
property; to recognize in the putative spouse an interest in previously held property of the decedent would unjustifiably disregard the
statutory scheme governing intestate succession of separate pro176
perty.

177
The intestate succession issue seems to have been argued poorly;
certainly, the court failed to grasp it. There were three stated bases for the
decision. The court found, first, that there was no precedent "suggesting" 178 support for the "widow's" position. It will be pointed out
below 179 that the court failed to consider strongly analogous precedents in
her favor. An initial examination of the second and third bases for the
decision will reveal the true issue, in light of which those analogous
precedents seem compelling. Those bases are closely related: that the
"equities" favoring a surviving putative spouse with respect to quasimarital property are inapplicable with respect to separate property of the
decedent, 80 and that a decision favoring the surviving putative spouse
would "unjustifiably disregard the statutory scheme governing intestate
succession of separate property. "181

176. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 576-77, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (citation omitted).
177. No authority was cited for the "widow's" proposition that she qualified as a
"surviving spouse." Id. at 576, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447. Instead, citing In re Marriage of
Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973), she argued that it was the intention of
the Family Law Act "to exclude concepts of fault and punishment from any influence in
the determination of family property rights." 50 Cal. App. 3d at 576, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
Since, as a putative spouse, she was by definition in good faith, it is difficult to grasp the
significance of the argument. In rejecting this reasoning, the court further confused the
issue, stating that "the right of a putative spouse to succeed to an interest in property
which would have been community property but for the invalidity of the marriage is not
based on concepts of fault." Id. While the argument was properly rejected, the court's
stated reason is equally elusive, since a person who is "at fault" (i.e., not in good faith)
does not qualify as a putative spouse.
178. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 576, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
179. See notes 190-263 infra and accompanying text.
180. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 576-77, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
181. Id. at 577, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
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Probate Code section 201 provides for the rights of a "surviving
spouse" with respect to community property. When succession to quasimarital property is at issue, a putative spouse is treated as a "surviving
spouse" under that section.1 82 Sections 221, 223, and 224 of the Probate
Code provide for the rights of a "surviving spouse" with respect to
separate property of an intestate decedent. The only issue in cases such as
Levie is whether a putative spouse should be treated as a "surviving
spouse" under those sections. While it is true that the joint efforts of
putative spouses do not contribute to the acquisition of separate property,
it is equally true that the efforts of a legally married person do not
contribute to the acquisition of separate prdperty of the other spouse. It
therefore begs the question to state that the "equities" of a putative
spouse differ depending upon whether rights of succession to quasimarital or separate property are at issue, since the same distinction
applies to the "equities" of a legally married person With respect to
rights of succession to community and separate property. Thus, as to
rights of intestate succession to separate property of the decedent, the
"equitable" position of a surviving legal spouse and a surviving putative
spouse is the same. The Levie court stated that the putative spouse's right
to succeed to an interest in quasi-marital property is based upon "equitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the status of marriage entered into in good
faith." 183 That very language dictates a decision in favor of the surviving
putative spouse in cases involving succession to separate property, since
the rights of a "surviving spouse" under sections 221, 223, and 224 of
the Probate Code are "benefits attending the status of marriage."
To hold a surviving putative spouse entitled to succeed to separate
property of the decedent would not be to "disregard the statutory scheme
governing intestate succession," ' 184 but to honor it. "[T]he right to
succession is not an inherent or natural right," 185 but purely a creature of
statute. There are no vested rights to succession; the law in effect at the
decedent's death is controlling. 186 A surviving legal spouse thus inherits
separate property of the decedent only because the statutes provide that a
person having the status of "surviving spouse" takes a certain share. If
182. E.g., Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948).
183. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 576, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (quoting Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d
681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943)).
184. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 577, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
185. Brennfleck v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., 3 Cal. App. 3d 666, 673, 84 Cal. Rptr. 50, 54
(1970) (quoting Estate of Simmons, 64 Cal. 2d. 217, 221, 411 P.2d 97, 100, 49 Cal. Rptr.
369, 372 (1966)).
186. Estate of Phillips, 203 Cal. 106, 109-10, 263 P. 1017,1019 (1928).
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there is no surviving spouse, the intestate distribution of separate property differs."i 7 To accord to a surviving putative spouse the status of
"surviving spouse" in such a case would be simply to recognize that,
because the marriage was entered into in good faith, he or she should be
in the same position as a survivor of a fully valid marriage.
To deny the status could lead to anomalous, if not shocking, results.
For example, envision a case such as Levie where the children were the
issue of the void marriage18 8 rather than of a previous marriage of the
decedent. The surviving putative spouse would be denied rights of
inheritance even though his or her natural children would be accorded
such rights and, in the absence of other issue of the decedent, would
inherit the entire separate estate. 89 Further, inheritance rights of a putative spouse who may have been "married" to and lived with the decedent for many years would be denied, while a legal spouse would qualify
for inheritance rights as a surviving spouse even if the decedent expired
on the wedding day.
Only three prior California cases have been found in which the court
was faced directly with the issue of a surviving putative spouse's rights of
succession to separate property. Although all three are technically distinguishable from Levie, it is not insignificant that in each the rights of the
putative spouse were recognized.
In Estate of Long,19° a man died intestate, survived by four halfsiblings and a woman who was found by the trial court to be his
"surviving widow" and to have believed in good faith in the validity of
the marriage at the time of the ceremony and throughout the relationship.' 9 The trial court awarded all of the quasi-marital property and one
half of the decedent's separate property 92 to the "widow.' 193 The
widow, Emma Long, had married one Johnnie Brown in South Carolina
in 1930 and separated from him in 1947. In 1948 she had "married" the
decedent, Clabe Long, in Los Angeles. Although she had filed suit
against Johnnie Brown in South Carolina in 1947 and had obtained a
5 The court
legal separation, 194 she apparently had never been divorced. 19
187. CAL. NROB. CODE §§ 221-224 (West 1956).
188. Issue of a void marriage are legitimate, CAL. CIv. CODE § 7002 (West Supp. 1977),
and thus have rights of intestate succession to separate property of their deceased natural
parent.
189. See Comment, Putativeand Meretricious Spouse, supra note 4, at 868.
190. 198 Cal. App. 2d 732, 18 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1961).
191. Id. at 735, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
192. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 223 (West 1956).
193. 198 Cal. App. 2d at 735, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
194. Id. at 736 n.1, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 108 n.1.
195. Id. at 736-37, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09.
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of appeal affirmed the trial court's decree of distribution. Even if her
prior marriage to Johnnie Brown was undissolved when she "married"196
Clabe Long, the record supported a finding that she was in good faith,
so that she was entitled to all of the quasi-marital property. 197 She was
entitled to one half of decedent's separate property, not because she was
a surviving putative spouse, but because it had not been proved that she

was not a surviving legal spouse. 198 The trial court was warranted in
finding that she was the "surviving widow" of Clabe Long:
It is well established that when a person has entered into two
successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of
the second marriage, and the burden is upon the party attacking the

validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had
not been dissolved by the death of a spouse or by divorce or had not
been annulled at the time of the second marriage.
The presumption of the validity of the last marriage was not
overcome in the present case because no evidence was offered by
the appellant to show that Johnnie Brown was alive at the time of the

ceremonial marriage in Los Angeles. 199
Long has been cited as having held that "[w]hen the relationship is
terminated by death, the surviving putative spouse has been awarded
• . . a spousal share of the decedent's separate property, ' ' 2° and, thus,

as contra to Levie. 20 Although those two points are technically inaccurate, the Long case is significant for two reasons. First, Long (as are
other analogous precedents hereinafter discussed) certainly is a California decision suggesting that a putative spouse is entitled to succeed to an
interest in decedent's separate property under the Probate Code.202 Second, the Long approach, involving recognition of the rights of a person
who appears to be a putative spouse by invoking the presumption of
validity of the marriage, may be useful to proponents of the inheritance
196. Id.at 738, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
197. Id. at 738-39, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 109. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956); Estate
of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948).
198. 198 Cal. App. 2d at 739, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 110. •
199. Id. (quoting Estate of Smith, 33 Cal. 2d 279, 281, 201 P.2d 539, 540 (1949)).
200. Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preservingthe Options, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 937,
941 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kay & Amyx].
201. Id.at 941 n.33.
202. Levie stated that "[n]o [such] California decision ha[d] been found." 50 Cal. App.
3d at 576, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 447. Levie involved a claim under CAL. PROB. CODE § 221
(West 1956), while Long involved a claim under § 223. It has been pointed out that "It]he
factual difference between allowing a putative spouse to share separate property with
decedent's issue under Probate Code § 221 rather than with the immediate family under §
223 is not sufficient to support a difference in result between Levie and Long." Kay &
Amyx, supra note 200, at 941 n.33.
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rights of such persons, since the true issue might be avoided in a
particular case. In Levie, for example, the facts were stipulated.2 °3 Since
more cases are likely to involve bigamy than incest,2° with the prior,
legal spouse perhaps difficult to locate, the opponents of the putative
spouse might have difficulty proving the invalidity of the second marriage.
A second significant precedent is Estate of Shank .205 There, a woman
died intestate, leaving an estate consisting entirely of separate property.
She was survived by a legal husband, a putative husband, and three adult
siblings. Under Probate Code section 223, the siblings were entitled to
one half of the estate and a "surviving spouse" to the other half; in the
absence of a "surviving spouse," the siblings would inherit the entire
estate under section 225.26 The trial court awarded the entire estate to the
siblings, finding the legal husband estopped from inheriting the property
and refusing to recognize rights in the good faith survivor of the second,
bigamous relationship. 20 7 The legal husband had acquiesced in and relied
upon a Mexican divorce decree which the trial court found to be invalid;
he had purchased property in his own name as a "single man" and had
cohabited with another woman, to whom he had referred as his wife.20 8
The court of appeal found that, as against the putative husband, the legal
husband was estopped from contending that the divorce was invalid. 209
The decedent had procured the invalid divorce, married the putative
husband, and permitted him to support her. Under those circumstances,
she was precluded from denying the validity of the Mexican divorce as
against her putative husband during her lifetime, and her heirs, being in
privity with her, were bound by the estoppel which bound her. 210 Since
there was no one with standing to assert the invalidity of his marriage, the
putative husband was thus a "surviving spouse." He was entitled to one
211
half of the estate; the siblings took the other one half in equal shares.
A final succession case worthy of note is Garradov. Collins,212 where
the dispute involved a two-thirds undivided interest in real property in
Los Angeles which was the decedent's separate property. The parties to
203.
204.
205.
206.

50 Cal. App. 3d at 574, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
The authors have no authority for this proposition.
154 Cal. App. 2d 808, 316 P.2d 710 (1957).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 225 (West 1956).

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

154 Cal. App. 2d at 810-11, 316 P.2d at 711.
Id. at 810, 316 P.2d at 711..
Id. at 811-12, 316 P.2d at 712.
Id. at 812, 316 P.2d at 712.
Id.
136 Cal. App. 2d 323, 288 P.2d 620 (1955).
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the action were her putative husband and two children of an earlier, legal
marriage. The trial court held the putative husband to be entitled to all
property which would have been community property of a valid mar-

riage, 213 including the other one-third undivided interest in the Los

Angeles realty, which had "acquired the characteristics of community

property. "214 He was also awarded one third of the two-thirds interest in
the real estate which was decedent's separate property, with the children
each taking one third of that interest. 215 The children appealed from the
award of an interest in the separate property to the putative husband; he
moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the children were not

aggrieved by the judgment. The court of appeal agreed that the children
were not aggrieved parties and were not entitled to appeal.2" 6 Assuming

the existence of a legal husband,217 the children would in no event inherit
the interest in question, since it would go either to the surviving legal
husband or to the surviving putative husband.218 Since the appeal was
dismissed, it was unnecessary for the court to rule on the merits of the
case. Two points are worthy of note, however. First, the trial court ruling
was left standing, so that, as against the children, the putative husband
retained the one-third interest of a "surviving spouse." Second, the court

of appeal envisioned the possibility that the "surviving spouse's" share
might have gone to the putative husband even as against the legal
husband.2 19

The question of the status of a putative spouse has arisen in other
analogous contexts. In each case, a surviving putative spouse has been
213. Id. at 325, 288 P.2d at 621.
214. Id.
215. Id.; see CAL. PROB. CODE § 221 (West 1956). The putative husband argued that
Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948), supported his theory that he
was entitled to a share in the separate property. 136 Cal. App. 2d at 325-26, 288 P.2d at
621. Krone, of course, involved quasi-marital property, as to which the surviving putative
spouse was held to have the same rights of inheritance as a legal spouse would have had
under CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956). Thus, in Garrado, the putative husband must
have been arguing that if he was an heir, or "surviving spouse" under, or by analogy to, §
201, he was also an heir, or "surviving spouse" under, or by analogy to, § 221. That
argument, which was accepted by the trial court, is the same as that advanced in the text
accompanying notes 182-89 supra.
216. 136 Cal. App. 2d "at326, 288 P.2d at 622.
217. There was no finding on that point, but the children were held bound by their
averment that the earlier marriage had never been terminated and that their father was still
living. Id. at 325, 288 P.2d at 621. The trial court had found that the earlier marriage had
not been dissolved by death or legal proceedings at the time of the putative marriage. Id.
218. Id. at 325-26, 288 P.2d at 621.
219. Id. Why one or the other? Why not split it between them? See text accompanying
notes 268-85 infra; see, e.g., Estate of Ricci, 201 Cal. App. 2d 146, 19 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1962).
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recdgnized by California courts, and by federal courts applying California law, as having the status of "heir," 220 "surviving spouse," 221 "surviving widow,

' 222

"widow,' '223 or "surviving wife, '

224

within the

meaning of those terms in various statutory enactments.
In Speedling v. Hobby,225 the issue arose in the context of a claim for
"mother's insurance benefits" under the Social Security Act.226 In order
to qualify, a claimant must have the same status as a "widow" relative to
succession to intestate personal property of the decedent. 227 The Speedling court held a surviving putative spouse entitled to such benefits. The
court relied on Estate of Krone 28 in finding that, under California law,
the claimant had the same status as a lawful widow. 229 Krone held that,
with respect to quasi-marital property, the survivor had the same rights as
a surviving legal spouse with respect to community property under
section 201 of the Probate Code. 230 The Speedling court discussed the
possibility that, under California law, "the putative widow may have no
right to take separate property," 231 but disposed of that issue by finding
that, with respect to the claimant, there was no separate property involved, "as all of the property . . . [had] been given community

property status by the California courts. "232 The claimant was thus
legally entitled to decedent's entire estate and had the same status as a
legal widow.2 3
A similar result was reached in Aubrey v. Folsom.234 There, a Social
Security referee had denied a surviving putative wife both mother's
220. Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 332 P.2d 773 (1958) (California Wrongful
Death Act).
221. Adduddell v. Board of Administration, 8 Cal. App. 3d 243, 87 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1970)
(Public Employees' Retirement System).
222. Neureither v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. App. 3d 429, 93 Cal. Rptr.
162 (1971); Brennfleck v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 3 Cal. App. 3d 666, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 50 (1970) (Workers' Compensation).
223. Aubrey v. Folsom, 151 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Speedling v. Hobby, 132 F.

Supp. 833 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (Social Security Act).
224. Holland America Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 313 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Cal. 1970)

(Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
225. 132 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
226. Social Security Act § 202(g), 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (Supp. V 1975).

227. Id. § 216(h)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(l) (1970).
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948).
132 F. Supp. at 836.
83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948); see CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956).
132 F. Supp. at 836.
Id.
Id.
151 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
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insurance benefits 235 and, in her capacity as guardian, child's insurance
benefits. 236 The district court upheld the denial of benefits for the child,
who was the daughter of the putative wife by her first marriage and who
had never been adopted by the decedent. 237 The surviving putative wife
was held entitled to mother's insurance benefits, however, since, under
applicable state law, she had a legal right of inheritance. 238 The government's argument that California law recognized property rights of a
surviving putative spouse only as a matter of equity and not as a rule of
intestate succession was rejected by the court.239 The government also
argued that, even if the surviving putative spouse was entitled to succeed
to quasi-marital property in the decedent's estate, she did not have the
24
same status as a wife or widow as defined in the Social Security Act, 0
since she did not have the same rights as a legal spouse with respect to the
decedent's separate property. 24 1 Citing Garradov. Collins242 as the only
California case even remotely bearing on the question, 243 the court noted
that it had been "unable to locate any reported California decisions
which have either granted or denied inheritance rights in a decedent's
separate property to a surviving putative spouse.'"2 The court then sidestepped the issue, holding that "if the applicant is treated as standing in a
family relationship necessary to qualify for benefits under the Act for any
purpose under the state law of intestate succession, such applicant would
qualify under § 416(h)(1)." 245 Speedling and Aubrey clearly interpret
California law to include a "right of inheritance" in a putative spouse.
235. Social Security Act § 202(g), 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (Supp. V 1975).
236. Id. § 202(d), 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (Supp. V 1975).
237. 151 F. Supp. at 838. To qualify for benefits, the child would have had to be either a
"child" or "stepchild" of the decedent. Under the Social Security regulations the status
of "stepchild" is dependent on the valid marriage of the applicant's natural parent and the
decedent. The daughter thus did not qualify as a "stepchild." She also did not qualify as a
"child," since Social Security Act § 216(h)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1) (1970), conditions a
determination of that status on the intestate succession laws of the state of domicile, and
under California law, she had no inheritance rights in the decedent's estate. In sum, for
purposes of the Social Security Act, the court was unable to recognize the girl as a
"putative stepchild."
238. 151 F. Supp. at 839-40 (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956); Mazzenga v.
Rosso, 87 Cal. App. 2d 790, 197 P.2d 770 (1948); Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189
P.2d 741 (1948)).
239. 151 F. Supp. at 839.
240. Social Security Act § 216(h)(), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1) (1970).
241. 151 F. Supp. at 839.
242. 136 Cal. App. 2d 323, 288 P.2d 620 (1955); see notes 212-19 supra and accompanying text.
243. 151 F. Supp. at 839 n.4.
244. Id. at 839.
245. Id. at 840 (emphasis in original).
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The Aubrey court, in interpreting section 201 of the Probate Code and
Estate of Krone,246 emphasized that this was a legal, rather than an
equitable right.2 47 Krone, the leading California case on the surviving
putative spouse's rights to quasi-marital property, appears to so hold,
although the court's language is perhaps purposefully vague; the court
there cited a number of prior cases holding a putative spouse entitled, on
equitable grounds, to a share in property acquired during the relationship
and concluded that those cases established that "upon the dissolution of a
putative marriage by decree of annulment or by death the wife is to take
the same share to which she would have been entitled as a legal
spouse.''248 None of the prior cases had considered the subsequently
enacted section 201 of the Probate Code, under which a surviving legal
spouse takes all of the community property in the event of the deceased
spouse's intestacy. Krone heldthat the enactment affected the rights of a
surviving putative spouse, so that such a person would "inherit all." 24 9
The claim was stated to be "pursuant to section 201,''250 with the
"widow's" rights as owner established "under section 201 ."51 Krone
thus can and should be read to hold that, at least with respect to quasimarital property, the rights of a surviving putative spouse conform to the
succession statutes,
rights of a "surviving spouse" under the intestate
2
and that those rights are legal, not equitable.
This interpretation was followed in Kunakoff v. Woods,253 in which
the issue was whether a surviving putative wife was an "heir" with
246. 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948).

247. 151 F. Supp. at 839.
248.
249.
250.
251.

83 Cal. App. 2d at 769, 189 P.2d at 743.
Id. at 769-70, 189 P.2d at 743.
Id. at 770, 189 P.2d at 743.
Id.

252. Since "putative spouses" were not mentioned in the California statutes, it originally was necessary to exercise "equitable jurisdiction" in order to accord them property
rights. A property right, including a right of inheritance, is nonetheless a right for having
been found to exist after an exercise of "equitable jurisdiction" as the following extracts
exemplify:

[S]he justly claims the estate by virtue of the authorities above reviewed, pursuant to
would now be contrary to established law to deny this putative
section 201 . . . . [I]t
wife her rights as a surviving spouse to inherit the total of the gains of the putative
marriage [under section 2011.
Id.
In some of the older cases there are statements that such property cannot be considered community property because community property is an incident of only a
legally recognized marriage. However, it is further stated that the property should be
distributed the same as it would be if it were community property. The more recent
cases have discarded this "double talk" . ...
Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59,63, 332 P.2d 773,776 (1958) (quoting W. BURnY,

357-58 (1958)).
253. 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 332 P.2d 773 (1958).
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standing to bring a wrongful death action under section 377 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. 54 The court held that she was an "heir" and could
maintain the action.255 The court quoted extensively from Krone, Speedling, and Aubrey, among other cases, and stated that the surviving
putative wife "under.

.

.[California] law, is recognized as a surviving

legal spouse for the purposes of succession .. . "'56and that "she
inherits .
an heir .

.
..

.[the decedent's] property, not as a matter of equity, but as
.,,97

More recently, in Brennfleck v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board,58 a surviving putative spouse was held to be a "surviving
widow" for purposes of receipt of benefits under the workers' compensation laws.259 The court relied primarily on Krone and Kunakoff and
interpreted Krone in the same manner as the Kunakoff, Aubrey, and
Speedling courts. 26 Also, in Adduddell v. Board of Administration,261 it
was held that a surviving putative spouse is a "surviving spouse" within
the meaning of the Government Code, for the purpose of entitlement to
benefits under the Public Employees' Retirement System, 62 since he or
she is "recognized as the surviving spouse for the purposes of succession
under Probate Code section 201. " 263
When rights of succession to quasi-marital property are at issue, a
surviving putative spouse takes the same share as would a legal spouse
not because of a de facto contribution toward acquisition of the wealth,
but because he or she is deemed to have contributed 6 ---that is, to have
had the status of the decedent's spouse. A surviving legal spouse shares
in separate property of his or her deceased spouse not as a matter of
natural right, or because of any contribution toward acquisition of that
property, but because of having had the status of "spouse." "Generically, the term 'spouse' may include a putative. . . [spouse]. "265 Descent
254. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 377 (West Supp. 1977).
255. 166 Cal. App. 2d at 67-68, 332 P.2d at 778.

256. Id. at 67, 332 P.2d at 778.
257. Id. (emphasis in original).

258. 3 Cal. App. 3d 666, 84 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1970).
259. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4702 (West Supp. 1977).

260. 3 Cal. App. 3d at 670, 672-73, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 50, 53-54.
261. 8 Cal. App. 3d 243, 87 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1970).
262. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 21364 (West Supp. 1977).

263. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 248, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 271 (citing, e.g., Estate of Krone, 83 Cal.
App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948)).
264. "The proportionate contribution of each party . . . is immaterial .... "
Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 63, 332 P.2d 773, 775 (1958) (citing Vallera v.
Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 683, 134 P.2d 761, 762 (1943)).

265. Id. (citation omitted).
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and distribution of property on intestacy are "strict creatures of statute," 2 66 and the courts have consistently "treated the term 'spouse' as it
appears in a statute as encompassing the term 'putative spouse.' "267

Recognition of the right of a surviving putative spouse to inherit
separate property of his or her deceased spouse may give rise to multiple
claimant problems when a legal spouse of the decedent is also a claimant.268 In a given case, the legal spouse may be estopped to claim as
such.2 69 In other cases, where the claims of both spouses are cognizable,
the problem is complex, but not insoluble. As the court noted in Adduddell, "it appears that when such problems have arisen they have been
found readily susceptible of equitable resolution.' 270
In a case falling under Probate Code section 224, where a single
"surviving spouse" would inherit all of the decedent's separate property, 271 the property should be divided equally between the two claimants.
This has been the solution in cases such as Estate of Ricci 27 2 and Estateof
Vargas, where both a surviving legal wife and a surviving putative
wife had intestate claims to quasi-marital property; it is supported by
other analogous authority. 274 This solution would be equitable in atypical
cases where the living arrangements were simultaneous.2 75 In cases
involving seriatim relationships, the surviving putative spouse,2 76 as the
266. Brennfleck v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 3 Cal. App. 3d 666, 673, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 50, 54 (1970).
267. Id. (emphasis in original).
268. It is possible, of course, that the legal spouse of the deceased would not appear as
a claimant. See Garrado v. Collins, 136 Cal. App. 2d 323, 288 P.2d 620 (1955).
269. See Estate of Shank, 154 Cal. App. 2d 808, 316 P.2d 710 (1957); notes 205-11 supra
and accompanying text.
270. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 249, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
271. This would be the case if the decedent left a surviving spouse and "neither issue,
parent, brother, sister, nor descendant of a deceased brother or sister." CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 224 (West 1956).
272. 201 Cal. App. 2d 146, 19 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1962).
273. 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974).
274. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 4703 (West 1971), dealing with workers' compensation
benefits, which provides in part: "If there is more than one person wholly dependent for
support upon a deceased employee, the death benefit shall be divided equally between
them." See also Brennfleck v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 3 Cal. App. 3d 666, 84
Cal. Rptr. 50 (1970) (dictum).
275. See Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974). The shares
would be different if decedent had been living simultaneously with more than two persons
with cognizable claims. See note 276 infra.
276. Or the most recent one, in the unlikely event that decedent was survived by a legal
spouse and more than one putative spouse. Should such a case arise, the authors suggest
that the several claimants share the estate in equal portions, since each would qualify as a
'surviving spouse."
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person who in all probability was living with the decedent at the date of
death, 277 would seem to have more "equities" than the legal spouse;
however, since each would be a "surviving spouse" within the meaning
of the statute, the suggested solution should apply.
In a case where the decedent was survived by a parent or parents,2 78 so
that under Probate Code section 223 a lone "surviving spouse" would
inherit one half of the separate property, the other one half going to the
parent(s), there are two possible solutions. The first, following the
statutory scheme, would be to preserve the parental share, with the
"surviving spouses" dividing equally the spousal share. The second
would be to divide all of the property equally between the "surviving
spouses.''279 That solution seems to ignore the statutory scheme, and
deprives the parent(s) or their issue of a share in the decedent's separate
property. It has been argued, however, that "since the parents would not
have taken had there been issue of either marriage,280 . . . [that result]

does not seem as harsh as would a denial of the expectation of either the
legal

. . .

or the putative spouse.'

'281

Whichever of the proffered solutions is adopted in a case where
parents are involved, it seems clear that in a case involving a child or
children282 of either or both unions,283 the interests of the child or
children should be protected. Descendants (particularly minors) are more
likely to have been dependent on the decedent for support than would
have been the decedent's parent(s) or sibling(s), and they are favored in
the statutory scheme. In the absence of a surviving spouse, for example,
the entire separate estate goes to the decedent's issue, if any, to the
exclusion of all other relatives. 2 4 If the decedent had one child, of either
marriage, that child should inherit one half of the separate property under
Probate Code section 221, with the two "surviving spouses" dividing
equally the spousal share of one half. If there were two or more children,
277. See, e.g., Sousa v. Freitas, 100 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970); Estate
of Ricci, 201 Cal. App. 2d 146, 19 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1962). But see Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal.
App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976). In that case, the husband separated from the legal
wife and later "married" the putative wife. He subsequently drove the putative wife from
the house at gun-point and, later, resumed living with the legal wife. They later separated
again, so that he was living with neither woman when he died.
278. Or, if both are dead, by their issue, or the issue of either of them. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 223 (West 1956).
279. Comment, Putative and Meretricious Spouse, supra note 4, at 868.
280. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 221, 222 (West 1956).
281. Comment, Putative and Meretricious Spouse, supra note 4, at 868.
282. Or lawful issue of a deceased child. CAL. PROB. CODE § 221 (West 1956).
283. Since children of a putative marriage are legitimate, CAL. CIr. CODE § 7002 (West
Supp. 1977), they would have the same inheritance rights as children of a legal marriage.
284. CAL. PROB. CODE § 222 (West 1956).
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they should divide the children's two-thirds share, with the spousal onethird share divided equally between the "surviving spouses." This approach would protect fully the rights of the children and, insofar as
possible, those of the "surviving spouses.' '285
Whatever solutions are adopted in the resolution of cases involving
claims by two "surviving spouses," it is clear that a surviving putative
spouse is a "surviving spouse," and that he or she should receive a
spousal share of the decedent spouse's intestate separate property. Neither logic nor justice can support a holding that a putative spouse is a
"spouse" for some purposes but not for others. The Levie decision is
wrong in its analysis of the "equities," wrong as a matter of statutory
construction, and it ignores compelling analogous precedents. It should
be rejected in the appellate courts and overruled by the supreme court.
V.

INTERPRETATION OF CIVIL CODE SECTION 4452: THE "BAD FAITH
PUTATIVE SPOUSE"9

No discussion of special problems relating to the property rights of
putative spouses would be complete without at least a glance at the
current dispute as to the proper construction of Civil Code section 4452
in cases in which one party to a "marriage" believes in good faith in its
validity, but the other party is in "bad faith"-that is, knows of the
impediment to the validity of the marriage. There is no doubt that, where
both parties are in good faith, or where one is in good faith and is
claiming a quasi-marital property interest in earnings of the bad-faith
party accumulated during the putative union, for example, section 4452
codifies judicially-developed doctrine and represents no departure from
prior law. Controversy exists as to, the meaning of the section in cases in
which a bad-faith party might attempt to assert a quasi-marital property
interest in property acquired during the relationship through the economic activities of the other, good-faith party. The possibility of this controversy was envisioned shortly after the enactment of section 4452 in a
perceptive comment in these pages,286 and the controversy was engendered by the interpretation accorded the section in In re Marriage of
Cary," itself one of the most controversial California decisions in recent
history.2 88
285. The approach to division suggested in the text was suggested previously in Com-

ment, Putative and Meretricious Spouse, supra note 4, at 868.
286. Comment, Dissolution and Voidable Marriage, supra note 3, at 351-53.
287. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
288. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976);
Kay & Amyx, supra note 200; Comment, In re Cary: A JudicialRecognition of Illicit
Cohabitation,25 HASTINGS L.J. 1226 (1974); Comment, In re Marriageof Carey[sic]: The

1977]

RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE SPOUSES

Section 4452 reads, in relevant part:
Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in
good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such
party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse, and, if the
division of property is in issue, shall divide, in accordance with
Section 4800, that property acquired during the union which would
have been community property or quasi-community property if the
union had not been void or voidable. Such property shall be termed
"quasi-marital property."

In Cary, the parties had lived together for more than eight years.
Although both knew that they were not married,2 89 they had established
what the court of appeal characterized as an "actual family relationship." 219 The court held that the Family Law Act 91 had superseded
"contrary pre-1970 judicial authority" 2" which had distinguished putative marriages and non-marital, or "meretricious," relationships, and
applied to any case involving a "determination of family property rights,
whether there be a legal marriage or not, and if not, regardless of whether
the deficiency is known to one, or both, or neither of the parties. 293
Property acquired during the relationship of Paul Cary and Janet Forbes

"Cary" was thus subject to equal division under Civil Code section
4800.294 In reaching this result, the court "recognized that the policy
underlying the Family Law Act was to remove the concept of fault, guilt,
or punishment from the grounds for divorce and the distribution of
marital property."

295

The court then noted that the Act applies not only to

valid marriages, but also "expressly covers a family relationship based
End of the Putative-MeretriciousSpouse Distinctionin California, 12 SAN DiEGo L. REV.
436 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Carey [sic]];Case Note, In reMarriageof Cary:
Equitable Rights Granted to the Meretricious Spouse, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 186 (1974).
289. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863. But see Kay & Amyx, supra note
200, at 945-46, stating that Janet Forbes "Cary" "testified that she believed common law
marriages were valid" and that "[t]he case was briefed and argued on the theory that Janet
claimed the status of a putative spouse."
290. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867. They held themselves out as a married
couple, had four children, bought a home, and generally conducted themselves in every
way as husband and wife. Id. at 348, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
291. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970 & Supp. 1977).
292. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
293. Id. at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866. The court emphasized that the Act required an
"actual family relationship" and not merely an "ostensible marital relationship" or an
"unmarried living arrangement." Id. at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
294. Id.
295. Kay & Amyx, supra note 200, at 946.

80

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

on a void or voidable marriage 'where either party or both parties
believed in good faith that the marriage was valid.' "296 The court
construed Civil Code section 4452 to require equal division of quasimarital property even in favor of a bad faith party to a void or voidable
marriage. Thus, if A, a "practicing bigamist,, 297 purported to marry B,
who believed in good faith in the validity of the marriage, and money
was acquired through B's economic activity during the union, upon a
declaration of nullity that money would be divided equally between A
and B, pursuant to section 4800. That result would be inconsistent with a
refusal to divide equally property acquired during a non-marital actual
family relationship simply because both parties knew that they were not
married.298
The Cary court's construction of section 4452 was almost universally
condemned by commentators. 29 9 However, in Marvin v. Marvin,300 a
case which "enjoys the singular honor of being one of the most misunderstood decisions of modern times," 30 1 the California Supreme Court
hinted that it might agree with the Cary interpretation. 30 2 Marvin involved an alleged express oral contract between unmarried cohabitants
that the parties "would combine their efforts and earnings and would
share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts
whether individual or combined." '303 The court held that such a contract,
if proved, 3 4 would be enforceable, "except to the extent that the contract
is explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services. '"305 It also held that "[i]n the absence of an express contract, the
courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether
that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership
or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties, ' ' 306 and that "[t]he courts may also employ the doctrine of quantum
296. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 351, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West
Supp. 1977)).
297. See Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 719, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1974).
298. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 351-52, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865-66
(1973).
299. See law review sources cited note 288 supra.
300. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
301. Kay & Amyx, supra note 200, at 954.
302. 18 Cal. 3d at 680 n.18, 557 P.2d at 120 n.18, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829 n.18.
303. Id. at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
304. The appeal was taken by the female participant in the defunct relationship from a
judgment on the pleadings rendered by the trial court for the defendant, her erstwhile
cohabitant. Id.
305. Id.

306. Id.
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meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts,
when warranted by the facts of the case." 3"
A thorough discussion of the Marvin opinion is beyond the scope of
this article; it has been treated fully in an excellent recent article.30 8 The
supreme court rejected "the reasoning"309 of Cary3 1 ° to the effect that
"the Family Law Act requires an equal division of property accumulated
in nonmarital 'actual family relationships,' "311 stating that such an
interpretation "distends the act." 3 12 The court thus recognized a continuing, if blurred distinction between putative marriages and nonmarital
"actual family relationships," a distinction which had been obliterated
by Cary:
We need not treat nonmarital partners as putatively married persons
in order to apply principles of implied contract, or extend equitable
remedies; we need to treat them only as we do any other unmarried
313
persons.

Thus we do not hold that plaintiff and defendant were "married,"
nor do we extend to plaintiff the rights which the Family Law Act
grants valid or putative spouses; we hold only that she has the same
rights to enforce contracts and to assert her equitable interest in
property acquired through her effort as does any other unmarried
14

person.

3

With respect to quasi-marital property rights, the supreme court in
Marvin noted the dispute over the Cary interpretation of section 4452,
but declined to resolve it. 31 5 The language of the court which suggests
possible agreement with the Cary interpretation appears in a footnote:
Even if Cary is correct in holding that a "guilty" putative spouse has
a right to one-half of the marital property, it does not necessarily
follow that a non-marital partner has an identical right. In a putative
marriage the parties will arrange their economic affairs with the
expectation that upon dissolution the property will be divided equally. If a "guilty" putative spouse receives one-half of the property
307. Id.
308. Kay & Amyx, supra note 200.
309. 18 Cal. 3d at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
310. The court also rejected the reasoning in Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758,
119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975), which had adopted the Cary rationale. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.
3d at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
311. 18 Cal. 3d at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
314. Id. at 684 n.24, 557 P.2d at 122 n.24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 n.24.
315. Id. at 680 n.18, 557 P.2d at 120 n.18, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829 n.18.
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under section 4452, no expectation of the "innocent" spouse has
been frustrated. In a non-marital relationship, on the other hand, the
parties may expressly or tacitly determine to order their economic
relationship in some other manner, and to impose community property principles regardless 31of6 [sic] such understanding may frustrate
the parties' expectations.
317
The phrase " 'guilty' putative spouse" is a contradiction in terms;
as interpreted by Cary, section 4452 would represent a complete departure from prior law. The authors join other commentators in arguing that
is incorrect and "should be rejected in an approthe Cary interpretation
3 18
priate case."
The legislative history of section 4452 has been thoroughly examined
elsewhere; 319 further detailed examination would be redundant. The most
recent work on the subject states unequivocally that "[n]ot a shred of
legislative history supports the Cary court's radical suggestion that section
4452 was meant to award property rights to a person 'who in bad faith
brought about the pseudomarriage.' "320 The legislative intent clearly was to
codify the decisional jurisprudence relating to quasi-marital property rights
of good faith parties:
It was the Commission's opinion that some protection was needed
for a good-faith spouse in a void marriage, especially one of long
duration. Though the property rights of a putative spouse are generally recognized in present decisional law, it was deemed wise to spell
out by statute the right of such "innocent" spouse to an interest in
the "quasi-marital property" and to support it by analogy to the laws
governing the division of property and alimony in the case of valid

marriages .321
Further support for the interpretation of section 4452 urged herein is the
contemporaneous enactment of section 4455,322 which, as amended,
provides:
The court may, during the pendency of a proceeding to have a
marriage adjudged a nullity or upon judgment, order a party to pay
for the support of the other party in the same manner as if the
316. Id.
317. Kay & Amyx, supra note 200, at 959 n.137.

318. Id.
319. See, e.g., id. at 948-51; Comment, Carey [sic], supra note 288, at 442-44.
320. Kay & Amyx, supra note 200, at 951.
321. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE FAMILY, REPORT 46 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
COMM'N REPORT].

322. For the legislative history of § 4455, see Kay & Amyx, supra note 200, at 949-51.
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marriage had not been void or voidable, provided that the party for
323
whose benefit the order is made is found to be a putative spouse.
Section 4455 provides for the first time legislative authorization for
spouse support payments upon declaration of nullity of a void or voidable
marriage; payments may be ordered only in favor of a good faith party.
In light of that section, it would be inconsistent to interpret section 4452
as having been intended to benefit a bad faith party with respect to
property division.
Section 4452 itself is ambiguous.3" 4 The basis for the Cary interpretation seems to be its provision that the court "shall divide, in accordance
with Section 4800, that property acquired during the union which would
have been community or quasi-community property if the union had not
been void or voidable." The words "that property" could be read to
include accumulations traceable to the earnings of the putative spouse,
even in cases where one of the parties was in bad faith. The section also
provides that if "the court finds that either party or both partiesbelieved
in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such
party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse.'325 Under the
Cary interpretation, the italicized language is mere surplusage; whenever
one party was found to have been in good faith, the equal division
provision would be triggered.
The better reading of the section is that only a party who is declared
"to have the status of a putative spouse" can place "the division of
property in issue.''326 Under that reading, the section would be in
conformity with prior law. Assume a void or voidable marriage between
A and B. If both were in good faith, all property acquired during the
union through the economic activities of either would be quasi-marital
property and would be divided equally. If A was in good faith and B in
bad faith, only A could raise the property division issue, and the only
property in issue would be that traceable to B's economic activities
during the union. Any property traceable to A's economic activities
323. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4455 (West Supp. 1977).

324. One reason for that ambiguity may be that the redactors of the section had in mind
the typical case which had been adjudicated in the past, where only one of the parties, the
"husband," was a wage-earner and, if only one party was in good faith, that one was the
"wife." Support for this suggestion appears in the comment to the original draft of §§
4452[014b] and 4455[014c]: "Section 014b essentially codifies existing case law ....
Section 014c creates new law to conform the support rights of a putative spouse to those
of a legal wife." COMM'N REPORT, supra note 321, at 76-77 (emphasis added). See note I
supra on the impact of cultural values.
325. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
326. Id.; Comment, Dissolution and Voidable Marriage, supra note 3, at 352; Comment, Carey [sic], supra note 288, at 446.
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327
would be A's separate property, as to which B would have no claim.
If property had been acquired with the commingled funds of both parties,
it could be treated as quasi-marital property, with the "community"
considered as owing a debt to A in the amount of his or her earnings used
328
for the purchase.
To adopt the Cary interpretation of section 4452 would lead to seemingly anomalous results, in that no property rights would result as a
matter of law from nonmarital cohabitation between persons who were
both fully aware of their status, while a person who deceived another into
believing in the validity of a "marriage" would be awarded one half of
the property attributable to the economic activities of the innocent party.
No justification for the latter result is found in the Marvin court's
statement that "no expectation of the 'innocent' spouse has been frustrated" 329 by such division. The putative spouse has been deceived as to
his or her marital status; the result under the Cary analysis is the "very
antithesis" 330 of the underlying basis of the putative spouse doctrine,
which is to extend benefits attendant to the status of marriage to a person
who believes in good faith that he or she is a married person, not to
reward a deceiver who could have had no legitimate expectations as to
331
status or property rights.
To adopt the Cary interpretation would lead to another anomaly.
Section 4452 is not applicable to probate cases. Thus, except in the
almost inconceivable event that the section, as interpreted in Cary, were
applied by analogy, the results with respect to a given couple would
differ depending upon whether the action was for a judgment of nullity or
one in probate. Clearly a bad faith survivor could claim no share in the
estate of a good faith decedent; 332 nor should a bad faith decedent be
allowed rights of testamentary disposition over any property attributable
to the economic activities of a good faith survivor.
The Cary interpretation of section 4452 should be rejected; the section
should not be read so as to reward the offensive conduct of a non-putative
party with rights "unavailable but for his [or her] misconduct." 33 3 Under
the Cary interpretation, the state would be "a party to the unjust enrich-

327. See Comment, Carey [sic], supra note 288, at 445-46.
328. Comment, Louisiana, supra note 100, at 112-13.
329. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 680 n.18, 557 P.2d 106, 120 n.18, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815, 829 n.18 (1976).
330. Kay & Amyx, supra note 200, at 959 n.137.
331. Id.
332. Miller v. Johnson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 123, 29 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1963).
333. Comment, Dissolution and Voidable Marriage, supra note 3, at 352.
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ment of the culpable non-putative spouse," 3' 34 and "such odious conduct

as fraud or force might become profitable ploys for the unscrupulous."
VI.

335

CONCLUSION

The basic outline of California law governing the property and inheritance rights of putative spouses is generally straightforward. Cases may
arise in the future which will present the complex problem of sorting out
the competing claims of a legal and a putative spouse of the same person,
with, in some instances, a third claimant involved. 6 California courts
have been confronted with similar problems and, while adopting different theoretical bases of decision, have protected the claim of the putative
spouse. Recognition and protection of the putative spouse in multiple
claimant cases should continue. The decision in Estate of Levie, in
which a putative spouse was denied spousal status for purposes of
inheritance of separate property, was unsound and should be rejected.
The "bad faith putative spouse" envisioned under the Cary338 court's
interpretation of Civil Code section 4452 is a mirage which should fade
from view.
Full legal rights attendant to spousal status should be accorded the
putative spouse. The legislature has taken steps in that direction with
respect to property 339 and support 340 rights of the putative spouse in an
action for a judgment of nullity. The legislature should take further action
to revise and reform the law; further developments should not be left to
decisional jurisprudence.
Perhaps the simplest legislative solution to the problem would require
a look to the civilian heritage from which California acquired both its
community property system 341 and the putative spouse doctrine. 342 One
section of the existing California legislation is perhaps hopelessly
vague; 343 all of our existing legislation should be replaced with concise,
334. Id.
335. Id. at 353.
336. Either the bigamist or someone claiming under him or her.
337. 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 123 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1975).
338. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).

339. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1977).
340. Id. § 4455.
341. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 P. 197 (1926); Spreckels v.
Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339,48 P. 228 (1897). See generally DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note
26, at 1-91.
342. See, e.g., Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920); Estate of Krone,
83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948). See generally DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note
26, at 95-99.
343. See text accompanying notes 286-325 supra for a discussion of § 4452.
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cross-cutting legislation. For example, looking to articles 117 and 118 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, we could enact two sections dealing
with the effects of void or voidable marriages:
1. The marriage, which has been declared null, produces nevertheparties and their children, if it
less its civil effects as it relates to the
344
faith.
good
in
has been contracted
2. If only one of the parties acted in good faith, the marriage
his or her favor, and in favor of the
produces its civil effects only in
345
children born of the marriage.
Although the Louisiana sections are literal translations of articles 201
and 202 of the Code Napoleon, 346 the redactors of the original Louisiana
provisions drew from both French and Spanish sources,347348and noted that
the provisions "were conformable to the Spanish law."
Adoption of the suggested legislative approach would clarify and
reform California law. Full legal recognition would be accorded the
putative spouse, and recognition would be continued for children of the
union. Since, absent a contract to the contrary, application of the com3 49
munity property system is one of the civil effects of a marriage,
community property rights would be accorded a putative spouse as a
matter of law. While the basic outline of California law is analogous to
that of the parent system and would not change, the suggested provisions
would insure that the claim of a putative spouse would be accorded full
legal recognition in multiple claimant cases. Since recognition of spousal
status for purposes of inheritance is also a civil effect of marriage, the
Levie decision would be rejected and a putative spouse would be recognized as a "surviving spouse" for all purposes under the Probate Code.
Finally, the second suggested section would dispel forever the Cary
myth of the "bad faith putative spouse."
344. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 117 (West 1952).
345. Id. art. 118.
346. Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. 797 (La. 1935); Comment, Louisiana, supra note
100, at 90 n.4. On the French law, see generally 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1,
nos. 1091-1117, at 613-24 (12th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
347. Note, Putative Marriages: What Are "Civil Effects"?, 36 LA. L. REV. 704, 705
(1976).
348. Id. at 705 n.8 (citing PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, art. 10, 1 LA. LEGAL
ARCHIVES 10 (1939), and LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. 4, tit. 13, L. I (Scott transl. 1931)). See
also DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 26, at 96-97. Parallel provisions appear in the
current Mexican code. CIV. CODE OF MEXICO arts. 255-256 (Schoenrich transl. 1950); see
also id. arts. 198-202. For parallel provisions in an earlier Mexican code see C6DIGO CIVIL
DEL DISTRITO FEDERAL Y TERRITORIO DE LA BAJA CALIFORNIA arts. 278-279 (1883).

349. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5133 (West 1970).

